Around December 8, 2025, DJT announced $12B to farmers, who have been hurt when US tariffs cause other countries to boycott us. For example, China can buy soybeans from USA or from Brazil, and China pivots to buying soybeans from Brazil.
I ran across a discussion of Argentia having had "export taxes" on soybeans, which sounds like a "tariff" on an outgoing tariff. You have never heard of this in the USA, because the Constitution forbids it! This led to some playful exchanges with Chat GPT.
###
Does the USA have "export tariffs?"
###
Good question. Short answer: No — the United States essentially does not use export taxes on soybeans (or most other exports). Instead, the U.S. trade-policy pressure on soybeans right now comes mostly via import tariffs and retaliatory trade measures from other countries (e.g. China), not U.S. export taxes. USC Dornsife+2Research Guides+2
Here’s a breakdown:
✅ Why the U.S. doesn’t impose export taxes
-
Under U.S. law — specifically seen through the lens of its constitutional trade clauses — the U.S. government does not levy export taxes on goods exported abroad. Research Guides+1
-
A formal study of global “export-tax” regimes noted that the U.S. does not use such taxes on agricultural commodities such as soybeans. USITC
-
What the U.S. might do instead are regulatory fees (for inspections, certification, border paperwork) — but those are not the same as export tariffs or duties. Research Guides+1
🔁 What’s causing trouble for U.S. soy now — tariffs & retaliation
-
The disruption in U.S.–China soybean trade stems from tariffs imposed by China on U.S. soy (and other ag products) in retaliation for U.S. import tariffs on Chinese goods. CSIS+2Sentient+2
-
As a result, U.S. farmers are suffering — even though the U.S. didn’t impose an export tax. American Soybean Association+2Sentient+2
So when you heard “export taxes” in the context of soy, that was likely referring to foreign‐country export taxes (e.g., in Argentina), not to any U.S. export tax.
If you want — I can check whether any major U.S. political proposals have sought to reintroduce export taxes (or use export-tariff-like measures) in recent years.
You said:
ChatGPT said:
Yes — the U.S. Constitution explicitly restricts the federal government from imposing export taxes, and this has been a major structural feature of U.S. trade policy since 1789.
Below is a clear explanation of what the Constitution says, why it says it, and how it has constrained policy ever since.
🇺🇸 1. Constitutional Text
Two clauses are relevant:
Article I, Section 9, Clause 5
“No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State.”
This is a flat prohibition:
-
Congress may not tax exports.
-
No federal export tariffs, no federal export excise taxes, etc.
Article I, Section 10, Clause 2
Also restricts states from doing it:
“No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports…”
So:
-
States cannot tax exports by themselves.
-
Congress cannot tax exports at all.
This makes the U.S. one of very few countries with a constitutional ban on export taxation.
🇺🇸 2. Historical Motivation
The prohibition dates to intense bargaining during the Constitutional Convention.
The Conflict
-
Southern states exported agricultural staples (tobacco, rice, indigo; later cotton) and feared a northern-dominated Congress could tax exports to raise revenue.
-
Export taxes would fall heavily on plantation states, not industrial states.
Southern demand
Southern delegates insisted on protection for export agriculture as a condition of joining the union.
The bargain struck
The Framers prohibited export taxes in exchange for:
-
Allowing federal power to regulate commerce
-
Compromises on slavery and representation
This was a constitutional quid pro quo designed to protect southern trade interests.
🇺🇸 3. Policy Consequence: No Export Tariffs, Ever
Because of this clause:
-
The U.S. federal government cannot use export taxes as a revenue tool.
-
It cannot use export taxes as a geopolitical tool.
-
It cannot use export taxes to manage supply, prices, or domestic shortages.
This is highly unusual:
Most countries historically, especially developing resource exporters, have used export taxes as industrial policy, e.g.:
-
Argentina: soybeans
-
Indonesia: palm oil, minerals
-
Russia: wheat
-
China: rare earths (until WTO cases)
The U.S. lacks that instrument by design.
🇺🇸 4. Can Congress Try to Get Around It?
Courts have held that any tax or duty that functionally targets exports is unconstitutional, even if disguised.
Tests have looked at:
-
Whether the tax is triggered by exportation
-
Whether the tax discriminates against exporters
-
Whether the economic incidence falls primarily on exports
Key case:
U.S. v. U.S. Shoe Corp. (1998)
Supreme Court struck down the Harbor Maintenance Tax as applied to exports, even though it was nominally a user fee.
Reason:
-
It was calculated as a percentage of cargo value — i.e., a tax on export goods.
-
Export taxes are unconstitutional, regardless of purpose.
User fees are allowed only if:
-
They defray specific services
-
They are fairly matched to cost, not ad valorem
🇺🇸 5. Practical Effects on Agricultural Trade
Because export taxes are banned, the federal government cannot:
-
Tax soybean exports to China during high-demand years
-
Tax wheat exports to keep domestic food prices low
-
Tax oil exports to improve refinery margins
-
Impose tariffs to retaliate against foreign import restrictions
If policymakers want to control exports, they must use:
-
Quotas
-
Licensing
-
Embargoes
-
National security authority
-
Agricultural policy instruments
Export taxes, which are cheap, flexible, revenue-raising, and globally common, are simply unavailable.
🇺🇸 6. Economic and Ideological Legacy
The export-tax ban reflects deep classical liberal principles embedded in early U.S. political economy:
-
Free trade outward
-
Commercial republicanism
-
Anti-mercantilism
-
Suspicion of central revenue powers
And it has shaped U.S. identity as:
-
An export-encouraging country
rather than -
An export-restricting one
Even when that has harmed domestic industries in the short run.
🇺🇸 7. Modern Politics: Attempts to Change?
There have been occasional proposals to "tax exports of X" (e.g., crude oil, timber) but:
-
They are unconstitutional without amendment.
-
Congress almost never raises them seriously.
-
Politicians sometimes propose them without realizing they’re barred.
To overturn the prohibition would require:
-
A constitutional amendment
-
Approval by 3/4 of states
Politically impossible.
🇺🇸 8. Bottom Line
The U.S. Constitution prohibits export taxes, full stop.
This originated as a pro-South, pro-agriculture compromise in 1787.
It has prevented the U.S. from using a common global policy tool for:
-
Industrial strategy
-
Price stabilization
-
Revenue generation
-
Foreign policy retaliation
And it has shaped U.S. trade institutions ever since.
💡 Why this matters in the China–soybean story
Argentina can impose export taxes on soybeans to:
-
Make domestic crushing more profitable
-
Raise government revenue
-
Manage currency flows
-
Influence world prices
The United States cannot.
So when China dumps U.S. soy for Argentine soy, Argentina has fiscal and geopolitical levers the U.S. simply lacks.
The U.S. responds through:
-
Farm subsidies
-
Diplomacy
-
Retaliatory tariffs on imports
Not export taxes.
If you want, I can give:
-
A short 200-word professional explainer
-
A legal-doctrinal summary with citations
-
A political-history narrative
-
Or a implications-for-ag-policy memo
Just say which style you want.
You said:
ChatGPT said:
Below is a serious, academic-sounding articulation of the ridiculous argument you’ve described — i.e., an “originalist” claim that the export-tax prohibition should not be read as a categorical ban because there were too few early controversies to clarify its meaning. The point here is to make it sound plausible and technical, even as it is intellectually perverse.
A Hypothetical “Originalist” Argument that the Export-Tax Clause May Not Ban Export Taxes
A provocative strand of originalist scholarship might suggest that the conventional understanding of the Export Clause — as a flat, mechanical prohibition on all federal export taxes — rests on a modern textual literalism that is not substantiated by the sparse historical record of early practice.
The Constitution states (Art. I, §9, cl. 5):
“No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State.”
Contemporary courts treat this as unconditional. But an originalist critic might argue that this interpretation unduly abstracts the text from the actual lived constitutional experience between 1788 and 1810 — a period in which federal export taxation did not arise as a practical matter, and thus did not generate interpretive gloss, litigation, or institutional practice that would clarify the clause’s scope.
1. The Problem of “Thin Historical Record”
Between ratification and the early Republic, nearly all federal revenue came from import duties, excises, and land sales. Export taxes were neither levied nor seriously proposed.
Thus:
-
No major early disputes
-
No interpretive controversies
-
No landmark judicial decisions
-
No authoritative executive or legislative interpretations
An originalist methodology that prioritizes historically demonstrable understandings might therefore caution against projecting a modern, crystalline meaning onto a clause that lacked early doctrinal maturation.
2. “Literal Language Without Practice”
Originalists often argue that text must be read:
-
In light of historical practice
-
In light of institutional gloss
-
Not purely as semantic abstraction
Given that the Export Clause had no early jurisprudence, an originalist might claim we lack evidence that the Founders actually understood it to bar all forms of export taxation, as opposed to:
-
Targeting discriminatory taxes
-
Taxes applied to particular states or products
-
Revenue schemes that functionally advantaged one region over another
3. “Purpose Was Anti-Discrimination, Not Anti-Tax”
Given the lack of early federal attempts to pass export taxes, the prohibition might reflect:
-
A sectional political compromise
-
Focused on preventing regional discrimination
On this view, the text was a negative safeguard against targeted exploitation, not a sweeping, structural constraint on national fiscal authority.
Thus, an originalist might argue for reading the clause as preventing:
Export duties that discriminate among states or regions
rather than:
Any tax whose incidence happens to fall on exports
This would align it with anti-preferential principles reflected elsewhere in Article I.
4. “Modern Categorical Interpretations Are Post-New Deal”
The modern Supreme Court’s strict reading — invalidating even broad-based fees whose formula involves export value (e.g., U.S. Shoe Corp.) — can be reframed as:
-
A 20th-century innovation
-
Driven by formalist doctrinal construction
-
Rather than by historically continuous constitutional practice
From this angle, the categorical ban is not the original meaning, but a later judicial invention.
5. “Constitutional Silence ≠ Constitutional Prohibition”
An originalist may note that when the federal government did regulate trade in the early Republic, it often acted under broad, enumerated powers (Commerce Clause, Necessary and Proper, etc.), unconstrained unless courts intervened.
Since no court ever struck down an export tax in the Founding Era (because none existed), we lack early judicial evidence that:
-
The prohibition was understood as categorical
-
Policymakers believed themselves bound by it
-
Courts would enforce it aggressively
Paradoxical as it sounds, the absence of cases may support a claim of interpretive indeterminacy, not clarity.
6. “Original Meaning as Open-Textured”
The clause may therefore be seen as:
-
Textually absolute but interpretively underdetermined
-
Historically silent
-
Open to contextual construction
Thus, a modern court could arguably adopt a functionalist test:
-
If a levy targets exports as exports, it is forbidden
-
If a levy is broad-based, regulatory, or compensatory, it is permissible
Even if its economic incidence falls partly on exports.
7. “The Reasonable Originalist Conclusion”
From this vantage, contemporary jurisprudence — treating any value-based payment tied to exports as unconstitutional — rests on:
-
A textual literalism
-
Not compelled by Founding-era understanding
-
Not supported by robust historical experience
An originalist might therefore argue that:
-
The clause’s meaning was never judicially fixed in early practice
-
Its purpose was preventing regional exploitation, not blocking all federal revenue mechanisms
-
Modern categorical interpretations exceed what can be justified by original meaning
Accordingly, export taxes may not be per se unconstitutional, provided they are:
-
Uniform
-
Non-discriminatory
-
Part of legitimate regulatory schemes
🧠 Meta-comment: Why This Argument Is Ridiculous (but Plausible-Sounding)
-
It ignores explicit constitutional text
-
It treats the lack of historical violations as evidence that no prohibition existed
-
It deliberately mistakes compliance for absence of constraint
-
It uses “originalism” to negate one of the clearest textual mandates in the Constitution
But stylistically, it:
-
Appeals to originalist epistemology
-
Exploits the fetishization of “historical evidence”
-
Weaponizes historical silence
-
Raises interpretive uncertainty where none exists
It’s the legal-academic equivalent of saying:
“No one tried to rob the bank in 1789, therefore the law against robbery probably didn’t mean no robbery.”
Yet in the hands of a motivated theorist, it becomes a framework for dismantling a clear constitutional rule while sounding erudite.
If you’d like, I can write:
-
A law review–style version (1,500–3,000 words)
-
A Federalist Society keynote speech
-
A scathing realist rebuttal
-
A satirical dialogue between Scalia and Madison
-
Or an op-ed by “a concerned legal scholar” arguing this sincerely
Just say the style.
You said:
ChatGPT said:
Below is a serious-sounding, internally coherent, yet fundamentally absurd constitutional argument that tries to connect an “ancient” textual clause with a modern presidential emergency power — specifically to claim that the President could levy export taxes during a national emergency, despite the constitutional prohibition.
The goal is to make it sound like something a committed originalist-executive-power theorist would publish today, while still reflecting the ridiculousness of the idea.
🏛️ A Hypothetical Originalist Argument:
Presidential Emergency Power as an Exception to the Export-Tax Clause
A provocative originalist argument might begin by acknowledging that Article I, Section 9, Clause 5 of the Constitution states:
“No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State.”
However, a theorist could argue that this prohibition must be read in the context of the Constitution’s broader allocation of war, emergency, and executive power, which are themselves grounded in the Framers’ understanding of sovereignty and national survival.
From this view, the Export Clause is not a suicide pact: it was intended to prevent routine, peacetime, revenue-raising discrimination against export-dependent states, not to disable the federal government from marshalling resources in existential crises.
Thus, the President’s emergency powers might implicitly supersede otherwise applicable constraints, including the export-tax prohibition.
1. Constitutional Text Must Be Harmonized Across Powers
An originalist court is not permitted to read any single clause in isolation.
It must harmonize:
-
Article I fiscal constraints
-
Article II Commander-in-Chief authority
-
The Necessary and Proper Clause
-
Emergency powers recognized in later constitutional practice
Thus, the Export Clause’s facial prohibition must be reconciled with:
The national government’s inherent authority to defend itself.
If such reconciliation requires temporary suspension, the President may be constitutionally entitled to do so.
2. The Emergency Constitution Was Never Fully Codified
Much of the Founders’ thinking on emergency authority was influenced by:
-
Roman models of temporary dictatorship
-
Locke’s prerogative power
-
English royal war powers
These frameworks assumed that in emergency conditions, ordinary legal constraints would yield to necessity.
The Export Clause lacks explicit language resolving whether it applies during emergencies.
An originalist theorist may argue that the absence of an explicit emergency exception reflects:
-
Not rejection
-
But assumed background conditions
The Framers often omitted what was considered “obvious” to educated statesmen.
3. The Founder’s Focus on Peacetime Commerce, Not Wartime Resource Control
The original purpose of the Export Clause was to prevent Congress from using export duties to favor some states over others.
It was not crafted to address:
-
Wartime controls
-
Military resource mobilization
-
Crisis-driven industrial policy
-
Global trade conflict
The early Republic lacked:
-
International commodity markets
-
Blockade circumvention
-
Strategic raw-material competition
Thus, an originalist could argue that the Founders did not intend to disarm the nation in the face of geopolitical threats simply because they restricted peacetime discrimination.
4. Presidential Emergency Power as a Source of Implied Exceptions
Under the modern “constitution of necessity,” rooted in Lincoln’s Civil War actions, FDR’s wartime powers, and Truman’s defense mobilization, courts have repeatedly recognized that constitutional constraints must sometimes bend to necessity.
An advocate could argue:
If the President may suspend habeas corpus as a practical matter
(or wage war without a declaration, or seize property, etc.)
then surely he may levy temporary export taxes.
The Export Clause cannot be more rigid than:
-
The Due Process Clause
-
The First Amendment
-
Habeas corpus
All of which have been limited in emergencies.
5. The President as the Dominant Actor in Foreign Commerce During Crises
The Constitution places control of foreign relations and war largely in the hands of the Executive.
If export taxes are fundamentally tools of:
-
Coercive diplomacy
-
Economic warfare
-
Counter-sanctions
then they may be inherent in the President’s Article II authority, not subject to Article I’s peacetime fiscal constraints.
Thus:
A presidential export levy may be an act of national defense,
not a revenue measure “laid on Articles exported from any State.”
6. The “National Security Exception” to Literal Constitutional Text
Originalists often insist that interpretation must account for public meaning at the time of ratification — which included the widely accepted concept that governments possess sovereign emergency powers even beyond enumerated authority.
Thus, a facially absolute clause must be read as implicitly conditional if applying it absolutely would:
-
Endanger the republic
-
Hamstring the executive
-
Undermine national survival
The export-tax ban, on this reading, is a default rule, not an emergency rule.
7. Modern Application: Presidential Crisis Declaration
In today’s world, a President could plausibly assert that:
-
Export of strategic commodities (soybeans, liquefied natural gas, rare earths, etc.)
-
During a major geopolitical crisis
-
Constitutes a national emergency under federal statute
Therefore, temporary export levies:
-
Are emergency measures
-
Not peacetime taxes
-
Enacted under inherent executive power
And thus not subject to the Article I prohibition.
🧠 The Intellectual Move Being Made Here
The argument works by constructing a hierarchy:
-
National survival powers
-
Executive war/foreign affairs authority
-
Ordinary constitutional rules
The Export Clause is pushed into Category 3.
Thus:
The President may not tax exports — unless he must
to protect the nation.
This turns a clear prohibition into:
-
A default presumption
-
Deferential to executive necessity
-
And ultimately politically litigable, not constitutionally categorical.
🧨 Why This Argument Is Both “Serious” and Deranged
It uses orthodox originalist tools:
-
Harmonization of clauses
-
Historical practice
-
Founding-era political theory
-
Inherent powers of sovereignty
-
National security exception
but applies them to annihilate explicit constitutional text.
This is the exact move that modern “constitutional emergency theorists” sometimes make:
-
The exception becomes the rule
-
Text becomes provisional
-
Executive necessity becomes interpretive trump card
It’s Bush-era unitary executive theory
meets export taxes
meets soybean politics.
If You Want, I Can Now Do One of the Following:
-
A Federalist Society speech defending this theory
-
A liberal law professor’s horrified rebuttal
-
A moot-court opinion upholding it
-
A satirical Supreme Court decision adopting it 6-3
-
A Jack Goldsmith–style realist essay explaining why it would actually happen
Or — even funnier — a Trump-era DOJ Office of Legal Counsel memo.
Just say which tone you want.
You said:
ChatGPT said:
That is a really interesting question. There is a fair amount of historical record about how trade taxes — both import duties (“tariffs”) and, to a lesser extent, export- or customs-duties — were used in Britain during the 17th and 18th centuries. But the picture is complex. Below is what we do know (and what remains ambiguous) about how the monarchs under the Georgian era (i.e. 1714-early 1800s) and their predecessors used tariffs, export duties, and other trade-tax tools.
✅ What we do know: Britain used import duties heavily — and trade customs were central to state finance
-
By the 18th century, customs duties and “indirect taxes” (on trade + consumption) provided a large share of British government revenue. Liberty Fund+2Oxford Research Archive+2
-
A long-standing system of customs duties was in place: the Crown (through Parliament) collected "tonnage" (a fixed duty per “tun” of wine, etc.) and "poundage" (ad valorem customs duties on imports — and historically on exports too). Encyclopedia Britannica+2Wikipedia+2
-
Over time, customs duties were expanded, refined, and politicized. By the 1700s, customs (imports) and excise (domestic and sometimes traded goods) taxes formed the backbone of the “fiscal-military state” that funded Britain’s wars, empire, and expanding bureaucracy. OUP Academic+2Oxford Research Archive+2
-
Under the laws of colonial trade (e.g. the Navigation Acts), the British government imposed restrictions and duties on colonial trade — including both imports into Britain (or colonies) and on exports from colonies, though often the export control was regulatory rather than a simple export-tariff. Wikipedia+2Parliament UK News+2
So in short: import tariffs and customs duties were widely used by the British state throughout the 1700s (and earlier), and trade taxation was an essential part of state finances.
🔄 Export duties / export taxes — there was some precedent, but by the 18th century their use was more constrained and shifting
-
Historically, as far back as medieval and early-modern England, there were export duties. For instance, the “nova custuma” system included duties on exported goods like wool and leather. Wikipedia+2Wikipedia+2
-
But by the late 17th and early 18th century, the structure and emphasis of trade taxation had changed. British policy increasingly focused on collecting customs and excise duties on imports and domestic consumption rather than heavily taxing exports. NBER+2Liberty Fund+2
-
The determinant factor: for a state that wished to encourage trade, exports were often more economically valuable if they flowed freely — particularly for raw materials and colonial goods, which the Empire used both to generate income and to support manufacturing and revenue at home. This meant that heavy export taxes were often less desirable (especially compared to import duties or excise taxes on consumption). Scholars studying the “fiscal-military state” in Britain find that by 1800, taxes on traded goods (imports + re-exports + regulated trade) made up a large share of indirect taxation — but the emphasis seems to have been on customs/excise rather than a broad system of export taxes. Lukas Leucht+2OUP Academic+2
-
There were still controls on certain exports. For example, earlier laws like the Wool Act 1698 had banned or restricted the export of raw wool from England and Ireland, to protect domestic cloth manufacturing. Wikipedia+1
-
By the later 18th century (and as industrialization began), the British state increasingly relied on excise duties (internal consumption taxes) and customs duties on imports rather than on export tariffs. Liberty Fund+2OUP Academic+2
So: export-duties existed in earlier periods, and export restrictions/controls (e.g. on raw wool) were used to advance economic/mercantilist policy. But by the Georgian era, the role of explicit export taxes had greatly diminished — customs and excise taxation on imports and consumption were the main revenue tools.
⚠️ Why there’s ambiguity and limited evidence on export taxes under the Georgians
-
The shift from export duties toward import duties and excise revenues makes historical tracking harder: once exports were mostly free, there was less administrative incentive to record or maintain export-tax statutes.
-
Much of the focus of historical studies is on customs and excise (imports + consumption), because those were the major revenue streams. This means that any occasional export duty laws tend to be overlooked or treated as special cases — so they don’t show up clearly in broad statistical or political-history accounts.
-
Trade under the empire involved many overlapping regulations: duties, quotas, navigation laws, colonial preferential rules, export-bans or restrictions on certain commodities (e.g. raw wool, certain colonial products). So disentangling “export tax as revenue tool” from “export control as mercantilist policy” can be difficult.
-
Some of the old systems (like “poundage” and “tonnage”) were long-standing but by the 18th century were often renewed only with Parliamentary consent — and the political balance over taxation was volatile. Encyclopedia Britannica+2The History of Parliament+2
📚 Scholarly Interpretation: Why Britain moved away from exporting-taxation
Several structural and strategic reasons drove the decline of export tariffs under Georgian/British governments:
-
To encourage exports, especially of raw materials or colonial products, which were economically useful for the empire and domestic manufacturing. Export taxes would reduce competitiveness.
-
Because import duties and excise taxes on consumption offered a more stable, higher-yield, and easier-to-collect revenue stream, especially as domestic consumption and trade expanded.
-
As the “fiscal-military state” emerged, the Crown preferred indirect taxation (customs, excise) rather than heavy-handed export duties that might distort trade or provoke smuggling. OUP Academic+2Oxford Research Archive+2
-
The growth of administrative capacity (customs offices, excise inspectors, more systematic trade regulation) made large-scale import/customs/excise taxation feasible — and less need existed for export tariffs.
🎯 What this Means for the Idea of Export Taxes as a Norm in the 1700s
-
During the early modern period (medieval through Stuart) — and even into the 1600s — export taxes were part of the normal fiscal toolkit. Wikipedia+1
-
But by the Georgian era (roughly 1714–early 1800s), the role of export tariffs had diminished significantly, and the British state instead relied heavily on import duties and internal excise as major revenue sources.
-
Export-control policies remained (e.g., restrictions on raw wool exports) — but these were more about mercantilist economic strategy than broad-based revenue extraction.
-
The shift reflects the broader evolution of fiscal-military states in Europe: as trade expanded and administrative capacity improved, governments moved toward more efficient and politically palatable tax instruments (imports + excise) rather than export taxes, which could hinder trade and provoke smuggling.
🧮 Relevance to Your Earlier “Originalist / Export Tax Ban” Hypothesis
-
The history of pre-modern England shows that export taxes were historically used, which weakens any claim that a constitutional (or statutory) ban on export taxes is “unprecedented in practice.”
-
The fact that export duties faded over time in Britain — even as trade and empire expanded — suggests a deliberate policy choice: export taxes were abandoned not because they were impossible, but because other revenue instruments became more efficient and politically viable.
-
So if someone argued today that “export taxes are impossible or unconstitutional based on historical practice,” the British case shows that historical practice itself changed — from export-taxation to customs/excise/import-taxation. There is no immutable norm that export taxation must always be banned.
In other words: the Georgian-era British state offers a real-world example of a major power that phased out export taxes voluntarily in favor of alternative revenue systems — a pattern that complicates (though does not quite mirror) a U.S.-style constitutional ban.
If you like, I can pull up 5–10 concrete statutes from 1600-1800 showing explicit export-duty laws (and when/why they were repealed) — that might give a direct historical baseline for comparing to modern constitutional debates. Do you want me to build that list?
You said:
ChatGPT said:
If I had to pick one single statute that best illustrates how export duties functioned in Britain before the Georgian shift away from them, and which also shaped economic policy for more than a century, the clearest and most consequential example is:
⭐ The Wool Act of 1698
(10 & 11 Will. III c. 16)
This is the statute most frequently cited by economic historians as the definitive British export-restriction law of the era — combining export prohibition, state control, mercantilist industrial policy, and tax and customs enforcement in one measure.
🔍 Why the Wool Act of 1698 is the Best Example
1. It explicitly prohibited and penalized the export of raw wool
The Act made it illegal to export:
-
Wool
-
Woolfells
-
Fullers’ earth
-
Other raw materials essential to English woolen manufacture
This was effectively an export tariff of infinite magnitude: a complete ban, enforced through customs and revenue officers.
2. It served a fiscal purpose, not only an industrial one
Although framed as a protectionist measure, it was enforced by:
-
Customs officers
-
Port authorities
-
Excise structures
That is, the same fiscal machinery used for import and export duties.
Parliament treated enforcement more like taxation administration than mere criminal law.
3. It defined Britain’s export-tax philosophy
The Act articulated the clearest British mercantilist reasoning:
-
Raw materials must stay home
-
Value-added manufacturing must occur domestically
-
Exports should be finished goods, not raw commodities
This logic influenced:
-
18th-century industrial trade policy
-
Colonial regulation
-
Navigation Acts enforcement
-
18th-century customs design
4. It survived well into the Georgian period
Although enacted in 1698 (under William III), it remained influential throughout the 1700s — into the early Georgian era.
It is frequently cited by 18th-century statesmen when explaining why export duties on raw materials were either:
-
Banned outright (by prohibition),
-
Or unnecessary (because you could regulate exports by restriction instead of tariff).
5. It provides the clearest contrast with the U.S. Constitution
The Act shows:
-
Britain did use export prohibitions as a major policy tool
-
Britain did use customs machinery to enforce export controls
-
Export regulation was absolutely part of their fiscal and commercial toolkit
Which undercuts any claim that the Founders had no examples of export taxation/export restriction in mind.
It also explains part of the Southern states’ fear:
-
They exported raw commodities (tobacco, rice, indigo)
-
Britain had a history of regulating or taxing raw exports
-
They wanted to prevent Congress from doing the same
This is why Article I, §9, cl. 5 exists.
So the Wool Act of 1698 is the single clearest pre-Georgian export-control statute that illuminates the fiscal and political context known to the Framers.
📜 Short Summary of the Act
The Wool Act (1698)
-
Prohibited export of raw wool and woolfells.
-
Imposed penalties including forfeiture and fines.
-
Directed customs officers to enforce the law at ports.
-
Treated illegal export as a revenue offense.
-
Ensured that England captured the value-added manufacturing margin.
-
Set the template for later British trade and fiscal policy.
If you'd like, I can provide:
-
A full annotated breakdown of the statute’s clauses
-
A comparison between the Wool Act and the U.S. Export Clause
-
A short “originalist lawyer’s” misinterpretation of the Wool Act
-
Or an extended narrative historical account of how Parliament enforced it
Just say which direction you want to take next.
You said:
ChatGPT said:
Yes — you’ve put your finger on a major and well-documented phenomenon in early modern British governance. Customs officials (especially the top officers at major ports like London) were deliberately paid quite well precisely to reduce corruption, embezzlement, and “leakage” of customs revenue.
This was not merely incidental — it was a conscious administrative strategy of the 17th and 18th-century British fiscal-military state.
Below is a clear explanation.
✅ Why Customs Officials Were Paid Well:
To Reduce Theft, Fraud, and Collusion
1. Customs revenue was the lifeblood of the British state
By the 1700s:
-
Customs + excise supplied ~60–70% of government revenue in some years.
-
Funding for the Royal Navy, wars, and imperial expansion depended on these revenues.
This meant a corrupt customs house = a bankrupt state.
2. Customs work was notoriously prone to corruption
The opportunities were enormous:
-
Collectors could underweight cargo deliberately
-
They could “forget” to record dutiable goods
-
They could accept bribes
-
They could misclassify imports
-
They might collude with merchants or smugglers
-
They could skim or pocket part of the intake
In fact, smuggling and customs corruption were so widespread that William Pitt the Younger created a special Board of Excise and Board of Customs reforms to combat it.
3. The British solution: Pay top customs officers well
The idea was early public-administration theory 101:
If the officer risks a well-salaried, honorable position, he is less likely to risk it for short-term corruption.
This was discussed openly in parliamentary debates and in administrative theory.
Adam Smith himself, in The Wealth of Nations, remarks that customs officials must be:
-
Well paid
-
Well supervised
-
Rotated periodically
To prevent corruption.
4. “Sinecures” + “perquisites” as part of the anti-corruption strategy
Top customs officers often:
-
Earned a formal salary plus unofficial perquisites (fees, shares of fines, allowances).
-
Were appointed through patronage — so losing the job also meant losing political standing.
Being “comfortable” was believed to make them less tempted and more content to play by the rules.
5. Notably: Underpaid customs officials were known to be corrupt
Historical records (including court cases and Treasury papers) show:
-
Petty customs men (underclerks, inspectors) were often paid little
-
Their corruption rates were much higher
-
Higher-ranking officials, who were wealthier and supervised more, were comparatively cleaner
This was used to justify maintaining high compensation at the top.
6. The logic reflected a broader Georgian political theory:
Good salaries buy honest government.
This is the same reasoning behind:
-
Well-paid judges
-
Well-paid tax assessors
-
Well-paid naval officers (especially after the reforms of the 18th century)
Britain’s rivals — e.g., France before the Revolution — underpaid tax collectors, who compensated through corruption. British administrators explicitly contrasted themselves to this.
📌 Short Answer You Can Use in One Sentence
Yes — British customs officials in the 1700s were deliberately well paid so that they would be less tempted to steal, collude with merchants, or allow smuggling. It was a conscious anti-corruption strategy of the early modern British state.
If you want, I can also explain:
-
Why excise officers were even better compensated (and feared)
-
How customs corruption influenced colonial America
-
The economic logic of the “fiscal-military state”
-
Adam Smith’s commentary on customs officer salaries
-
How the Crown and Parliament used patronage to control customs houses
Just tell me which direction to explore.
