Given the sudden and large layoffs that occurred in 1H2025, you might wonder why the government needs any easier rules to dismiss workers.
Here are final rules from the Office of Personnel Management on February 5, 2026.
At bottom, I include some Q&A with Chat GPT.
##
Federal News Network
Final Rule in Federal Register, Improving Performance, Accountability and Responsiveness in the Civil Service, A Rule by the Personnel Management Office on 02/06/2026
The rule in THE HILL
Economic Policy Institute
Nature
https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-026-00443-w
###
###
1) Is it right that the final rule creates the category, but people generally have to be moved into it before they can be dismissed under its streamlined rules?
Yes — that’s roughly correct, with one important nuance: what gets “moved” first is typically the position, and then the incumbent employee is treated as occupying a position in the new schedule.
What the final rule does (in plain English) is authorize agencies to convert certain “policy-influencing” positions into “Schedule Policy/Career” and then treat those jobs as career (not political appointees) but “at-will” for removal-procedure purposes—i.e., excepted from the usual adverse-action/performance procedures and MSPB appeal channels that normally slow removals. (Federal Register)
And you’re also tracking the process correctly: OPM’s implementation guidance describes an agency identification + OPM review pathway, and it emphasizes that placement into Schedule Policy/Career requires an Executive Order / presidential action to designate positions (the rule itself doesn’t “auto-convert” a list of jobs on Day 1). (U.S. Office of Personnel Management)
So: Final rule = creates/implements the mechanism. Actual removals under the new mechanism = generally require (i) positions designated into the schedule and (ii) the employee occupying such a designated position.
2) Why bother, if they already fired lots of people “willy-nilly” via DOGE early in the second term?
Because the early-term firing/downsizing tactics and Schedule Policy/Career solve different legal/operational problems:
(A) “DOGE-style” separations are often about headcount reduction or rapid terminations using existing levers (probationary removals, reorganizations, proposed RIFs, pressure-to-resign programs, etc.). Those can be fast, but they’re also litigation magnets, can get enjoined, and don’t necessarily give a clean, durable way to remove entrenched career policy staff for “performance/obstruction” narratives. Reuters explicitly ties the broader workforce shake-up to DOGE and large numbers of separations/pressure exits. (Reuters)
(B) Schedule Policy/Career is designed to be a structural change to employment protections for a targeted slice of the workforce—policy-influencing roles—so that when the administration wants to remove someone in that slice, it can do so without the normal “lengthy procedural hurdles” (as OPM frames it), rather than trying to fit every case into the traditional Chapter 43/75 + MSPB pathway. (Federal Register)
(C) The final rule also tries to draw a bright line against the critique “this is just a mass-layoff tool.” OPM’s own release and guidance repeatedly say it may not be used to conduct workforce reshaping/mass layoffs or to circumvent RIF rules—which is basically an admission that the administration anticipates that criticism and is trying to cabin it. (U.S. Office of Personnel Management)
So the short answer is: early DOGE actions can cut quickly, but they’re not the same as a durable reclassification regime aimed at policy-influencing career positions—and the administration appears to want both tools.
3) How far did they get with this in Trump’s first term?
Not very far in implementation, despite lots of noise.
In the first term, the comparable initiative was Executive Order 13957 (Oct 21, 2020), “Schedule F.” It was issued late, and then revoked on Jan 22, 2021 by President Biden. (Trump White House Archives)
GAO’s retrospective is the key “how far did it get?” document:
GAO found that no agencies actually placed positions into Schedule F before it was revoked. (Government Accountability Office)
Two agencies submitted petitions to OPM. OPM approved OMB’s petition to move 136 positions, affecting ~415 employees (about 68% of OMB)—but GAO reports OMB did not complete the HR processing steps before the change in administration, and implementation effectively halted around inauguration time. (Government Accountability Office)
So: in Trump 1.0, Schedule F existed on paper, an OMB conversion plan was approved, but nobody actually got reclassified before revocation (per GAO). That’s the cleanest “how far did they get?” answer.
Yes — that’s a fair high-level contrast, and it matters legally.
First Term: Executive Order 13957 (“Schedule F”)
In October 2020, President Trump issued Executive Order 13957, creating “Schedule F” within the excepted service.
Key features:
It was created solely by executive order.
OPM was directed to implement it.
Agencies were told to identify policy-influencing positions.
It came very late (Oct 21, 2020).
Per GAO, no employees were actually converted before it was revoked in January 2021.
Legally, this was a presidential directive layered on top of existing civil service statutes and OPM regulations, without a completed formal rulemaking process beforehand. It relied heavily on executive authority to define excepted service categories.
Second Term: Formal Rulemaking Creating “Schedule Policy/Career”
In 2025–2026, OPM used notice-and-comment rulemaking under the Administrative Procedure Act to create a new designation (renamed “Schedule Policy/Career”).
Key differences:
It went through proposed rule → public comments → final rule in the Federal Register.
It includes definitions, scope limits, procedural language, and implementation guidance.
It sets up a structured process:
agency identifies positions → OPM reviews → President designates via EO.It expressly addresses criticisms raised against Schedule F (e.g., disclaimers about not using it for mass layoffs or RIF circumvention).
This makes the second-term approach:
More procedurally durable under APA review.
Harder to attack as “arbitrary and capricious” purely on process grounds.
Less vulnerable to the argument that it’s just an impulsive late-term maneuver.
Conceptually
You could summarize it this way:
Trump 1.0: “Create Schedule F by executive order; implementation left to agencies; overtly political framing; never operationalized.”
Trump 2.0: “Embed the concept in the Code of Federal Regulations via formal APA rulemaking; rename it; build a structured conversion mechanism; then use presidential designation to operationalize.”
It’s the difference between a top-down presidential directive and a regulatory architecture built by OPM first, then activated by presidential action.
That doesn’t mean litigation risk disappears — but procedurally, the 2026 version is clearly more elaborate and defensively constructed than the 2020 Schedule F EO.
