Monday, July 14, 2025

Religion, Values, Thick and Thin

ESSAY 1 (Robinson), BOOK 1 (Rauch)

 A few weeks ago, I ran into a book review that guided me to Jonathan Rauch's book "CROSS PURPOSES."   The link coming up isn't the same one, but it's a similar entry point, a book review by Anthony Robinson.  Link:

https://www.anthonybrobinson.com/thin-sharp-or-thick/

In his book CROSS PURPOSES, Rauch argues that we have slipped into many cases of "thin" religion - say, Presbyterians -and these play less and less role in society and the current cultural/political dialog.  

But more and more we hear about what Rauch calls "sharp" religions - for example, groups that are religious groups very strong on MAGA.    

Rauch argues that we need to restore the place of "thick" religions, Christian religions that are demanding of one's self and demanding of one's life, with regard to helping the poor, helping the helpless, while respecting values like tolerance.   And a shared sense of the common good.

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ESSAY 2 (Brooks), BOOK 2 (MacIntyre)

I just ran across an essay by David Brooks in Atlantic that asks, "Why do many think Trump is Good?" (with regard to lying, ridiculing weak persons and opponents, etc).    While not a book review, Brooks gives central attench to an author named MacIntyre.  Find Brooks here:

https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2025/07/trump-administration-supporters-good/683441/

Brooks says the answer is found in a book - the book AFTER VIRTUE by Alasdair MacIntyre.   He charts a breakdown in common social values stemming from the Enlightenment, a period disgusted by the prior deadly wars of religion (30 Years War, etc).   

We've slowly drifting to a place where "thick"values (per Rauch) are replaced by goal-of-the-day or autocrat-of-the-day who provides a "reason for living" and a "solution" to structuring our world.   Brooks then brings us this quote from Ted Clayton, "MacIntyre argues that today we live in a fragmented society made up of individuals who have no conception of the common good, no way to come together to pursue a common good, no way to persuade one another what the common good might be, and indeed most of us believe that the common good does not and cannot exist."

Brooks writes, "[Today's leaders]speak the languages we moderns can understand. The language of preference: I want. The language of power: I have the leverage. The languages of self, of gain, of acquisition. [Such a politician] doesn’t subsume himself in a social role. He doesn’t try to live up to the standards of excellence inherent in a social practice. He treats even the presidency itself as a piece of personal property he can use to get what he wants. As the political theorist Yuval Levin has observed, there are a lot of people, and Trump is one of them, who don’t seek to be formed by the institutions they enter. They seek instead to use those institutions as a stage to perform on, to display their wonderful selves."

Brooks sums up, I think I can say, by advocating continued pluralism but with common humanist fundamentals (honesty, charity).    [Brooks and MacIntyre end up not too far from Robinson and Rauch above. pluralist tolerance + demanding humanist fundamentals = "thick" religion).  

Brooks is also the author of, "How to know a person: The art of se eing others deeply and being deeply seen."

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AI ESSAY ON SAME

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Thin, Sharp, and Thick: Rauch’s Typology of American Christianity in Light of MacIntyre’s After Virtue

In contemporary discussions of American religion, the distinction between different strands of Protestant Christianity often serves as a lens through which to view the broader cultural and moral fragmentation of modern society. In the passage provided, Rauch divides American Christianity into three categories: thin, sharp, and thick. This taxonomy is not merely descriptive of ecclesial trends; it also offers a framework for understanding the cultural and ethical functions these religious forms now serve in American life. When placed alongside Alasdair MacIntyre’s celebrated diagnosis of modern moral culture in After Virtue, Rauch’s categories resonate in revealing and instructive ways. Both Rauch and MacIntyre, though writing in different registers and for different audiences, identify the erosion of tradition and the consequent fragmentation of moral discourse as central to the malaise of late modernity. This essay will argue that Rauch’s "thin," "sharp," and "thick" align closely with MacIntyre’s analysis of emotivism, Nietzschean will-to-power, and the Aristotelian tradition of virtue ethics respectively.

Thin Christianity: Emotivism and the Collapse of Tradition

Rauch’s category of “thin” Christianity refers chiefly to the mainline Protestant denominations—Methodists, Episcopalians, Presbyterians, and their kin—that have, over the past half-century, embraced cultural assimilation to such a degree that their distinctiveness has been eroded. These churches, Rauch notes, prioritized civic engagement and social respectability over theological particularity or rigorous discipleship. As a result, they became almost indistinguishable from secular civic organizations like Rotary Clubs. The pursuit of social justice, inclusion, and diversity supplanted doctrinal creeds or sacramental commitments. Rauch’s critique is that these churches ceased to offer a distinctive moral or spiritual alternative to secular life, leaving many adherents to rightly wonder: if being a good person is the goal, why bother with church at all?

This critique aligns precisely with MacIntyre’s description of emotivism, the moral philosophy that arises when traditions collapse and moral discourse becomes merely the expression of individual preferences. In After Virtue, MacIntyre laments that modernity has severed the connection between moral claims and any coherent narrative of the good life. What remains are arbitrary assertions, cloaked in the language of morality but lacking any foundation in a shared tradition of virtue. Thin Christianity, in this light, is not so much a perversion of tradition as its evaporation. Its social gospel, stripped of doctrinal ballast, floats free of the historical practices that once gave Christianity its moral coherence. MacIntyre would see such churches as casualties of modernity’s fragmentation, their ethical language evacuated of real content because their practices no longer sustain a narrative of the telos, or purpose, of human life.

Sharp Christianity: Ressentiment and the Will to Power

The “sharp” variant of Christianity identified by Rauch emerges as a reaction against the thinness of mainline Protestantism. These are churches animated by grievance, fear, and a perceived loss of cultural dominance. They align themselves with political movements promising restoration of power and influence, often culminating in the embrace of authoritarian populism and figures like Donald Trump. Rauch’s reference to the Faustian bargain—trading principle for political gain—frames these churches as driven less by theological integrity than by a desperate clutching at cultural relevance through power.

MacIntyre’s framework also accounts for this phenomenon. In the wake of emotivism’s rise, he argues, modern societies offer two paths: acquiescence to liberal fragmentation or a retreat into Nietzschean will-to-power. Lacking the resources of a coherent tradition, those on the right often turn to tribalism, asserting their identity and interests through force rather than reasoned discourse or shared virtue. Sharp Christianity exemplifies this descent into ressentiment: it defines itself against perceived enemies, roots its identity in victimhood, and seeks restoration through political domination rather than moral exemplarity. For MacIntyre, such communities are no less products of modernity’s failure than thin churches; both are unmoored from traditions of virtue, one capitulating to liberalism, the other to authoritarianism.

Thick Christianity: Tradition, Practice, and Virtue

Against both thin accommodation and sharp reaction, Rauch posits “thick” Christianity—religious communities characterized by robust practices, sacramental life, and a willingness to be countercultural. These communities cultivate distinct identities through rituals, disciplines, and a shared narrative centered on Christ rather than political leaders. Rauch notes the appeal of Eastern Orthodoxy as an example of such a “thick” tradition, offering adherents a way of life rich in meaning and resistant to the cultural vacuity of modernity.

This vision of “thickness” aligns most fully with MacIntyre’s positive proposal. In After Virtue, he advocates for a return to tradition-constituted communities where virtues are cultivated through practices ordered toward goods internal to those practices. Such communities sustain moral life by embedding individuals within narratives that give meaning to virtues like courage, temperance, and justice. MacIntyre’s famous conclusion, calling for “another—doubtless very different—St. Benedict,” is not a call for monastic retreat per se, but for the formation of intentional communities capable of preserving the moral life amid a disintegrating culture. Thick Christianity, in Rauch’s terms, embodies precisely this project: sustaining virtue through liturgy, sacrifice, and a coherent vision of the good.

Conclusion: Tradition and the Possibility of Renewal

In sum, Rauch’s typology of American Christianity can be fruitfully read through the lens of MacIntyre’s After Virtue. Thin Christianity mirrors emotivist liberalism; sharp Christianity reflects Nietzschean tribalism; thick Christianity approximates the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition of practices ordered toward virtue. Both thinkers diagnose the fragmentation of modern moral life and locate hope in communities that refuse the terms of modernity’s false choices. Where Rauch observes the sociology of American religion, MacIntyre provides the philosophical anthropology to explain it: communities bereft of tradition cannot sustain virtue. If there is any future for moral renewal, it lies with those who, through thick practices and traditions, can reconstitute the possibility of the good life.


If you'd like, I can expand this into a longer academic article with citations and references to After Virtue and related scholarship.